Red red line

I was struck by the language reported this week in coverage of Boeing’s negotiations with their workers (or unions, depending on whose point of view you’re taking – the employer maintains they’re going by the book, the union accuses the proposal of being made via media channels).

The striking phrase – one that we’ve likely all heard before, and perhaps even used ourselves – was that Boeing’s offer was “best and final”. There’s something of a spectrum here in terms of what that might mean. At one end, Boeing have reached the limits to which they are prepared to flex and are entirely comfortable with managing the deadlock that might arise from failing to gain an agreement. At the other end, we have perhaps the more typically seen context in which such language might be used – in a competitive negotiation where one party is trying to robustly manage expectations, but there may still be flexibility to explore in order to gain agreement. In other words, neither “best” nor “final”. In either case, my advice would be to think very carefully before asserting a position so absolutely.

Why? Because at either end of the spectrum, there is risk. If you have genuinely reached your limit position(s) then signalling that precise information to your counterparty with a “final” offer might not be in your best interests, particularly if you will be negotiating with them again in the future. Similarly, most of us resent being told “take it or leave it” and this rarely helps the levels of tension in the negotiation. If, on the other hand, there is flexibility but one party has made the assertion competitively or out of frustration, then the probability will be that further necessary movement exposes the “final” offer as being, well, not final at all. Not only does this damage the credibility of the party making the “final” offer, it may encourage the counter-party to press even harder. At both ends of the spectrum, there is also the metaphorical trap of painting oneself into a corner, which is rarely a good look.

There are lots of ways in which negotiators can manage these risks; if you are tempted to make a “final” offer then revisit your preparation and look at where you may be able to trade value outside of the issues that are contentious or at their limits; explore the circumstances in which your counterparty is prepared to be flexible in areas that may offer the opportunity to work towards a workable deal; be prepared to give in areas of lesser importance to secure the agreement you want or need on a more important area; highlight where you may be able to be flexible in order to get what you want; and more. If in receipt of a “final” offer then first and foremost probe; ask good questions and understand whether you’re dealing with a limit position or simply competitive expectation management. If it’s a genuine limit position then explore any other areas where you may still be able to trade value to make the deal implementable at your end (assuming you can live with the limit position, of course). Where it’s clearly not a “final” position then firstly don’t allow it to influence your view of what a good deal looks like, and avoid the temptation to up the stakes in terms of adversarial behaviour (by pointing it out, mirroring it, etc). Instead, think about how you can help your counterparty move to where they need to with some kind of dignity intact – they’re much more likely to offer up flexibility to secure a deal if they feel encouraged and safe to do so.

The ”best and final” offer was made on Monday. On Tuesday, the Unions registered their response: “not interested”. As a response I think it’s pretty much “can we borrow your paint and brush, we’ve seen a nice corner opposite yours”…